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176 PEOPLE v. NEWMAN [24 C.2d 
of the opinion, the court approved the admission and use of 
that evidence in the following language: "Appellant con-
cedes .that People v. Hinkle, 64 Cal.App. 375 [221 P. 693], 
has held that. it is permissible for an officer to testify that 
certain exhibits were registers of bets. J.Ie attempts to dif-
ferentiate this case from the one before us by calling atten-
tion to the fact that the defendant here was acquitted of 
having received and held money for bets and of recording 
bets. We fail to see how this fact alters the rule of evidence 
which permitted the admission of the testimony of an expert. 
We think the case of People v. Hinkle is controlling, and 
that further discussion of the point is unnecessary." 
People v. Derrick, supra, involves the violation of subdi-
visions 2, 3 and 4 of section 337a, where testimony of the 
same character was held to be admissible. In a cigar box in 
the room in which the defendant was carrying on the barber 
business, papers were found on which were written figures 
and names more or less unintelligible to persons inexperienced 
in the methods of gambling. Two officers who had worked Oll 
gambling details in the city of the arrest and had become 
familiar with expressions, symbols and characters used by 
bookmakers in recording bets on horse races, were permitted 
to testify to the meaning of such symbols and characters. 
The appellate court held that the characters constituted a 
proper subject of expert testimony and sustained the admis-
sion of the testimony of the officers. 
The ruling in these authorities appeals to us as most rea-
sonable and logical, and we have no hesitancy in following 
it and holding that the trial court here erred in striking out 
the evidence as to the meaning of the letters and figures 
found in Exhibit D and other exhibits admitted in evidence 
in this action. Any language found in People v. Davis, supra, 
in conflict with these views is disapproved. 
[3] The question then arises whether this court may 
consider this evidence for any purpose upon the present 
appeal. As before noted appellant's sole ground in support 
of his appeal is that the evidence is not sufficient to support 
the judgment. The evidence in question was stricken out 
by the court at the close of the trial and after the case had 
been finally submitted by the court for its decision. No 
'effort had been made during the trial by appellant to contro-
vert .or impeach· this evidence or to show in any manner its 
71~3-f 
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inapplicability to the case against him. Whether under such 
circumstances a reviewing court could consider such evidence 
has never been passed upon by this court or any appellate 
court of the state in any criminal case so far as our knowl-
edge goes. In civil actions the rule is well established that 
it is permissible for the reviewing court to consider evidence 
erroneously stricken out by the court on motion of the appel-
lant in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the determination of the trial court. (Gray v. South-
ern Pacific 00., 23 Ca1.2d 632, 644 [145 P.2d 561].) Our 
attention has not been called to any criminal case from any 
court where the present question has been given considera-
tion. As this evidence against the appellant was admitted 
during the trial, the appellant was confronted with it after 
its admission up to the final submission of the case, and as 
we have seen he made no attempt to controvert it. Had the 
trial court not made its erroneous order, the appellant would 
have been in the same situation as he is now in, if we give 
consideration to the stricken evidence in determining the 
question as to whether there is evidentiary support of the 
judgment. Under this condition of the record we think there 
can be no legal objection to our giving this evidence the 
same force and effect as though it had not been erroneously 
stricken out by the court. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Tray-
nor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 4498. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1944.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FLORENCIO "FRANK" 
ALCALDE, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Sufticiency-Oircumstantial Evidence.-
A conviction of first degree murder of a blond woman was sus-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(1); [2] Witnesses, 
§ 207; [3] Homicide, § 108; [4] Criminal Law, § 433 (2) i [5] 
Homicide, § 183; [6] Criminal Law, § 1384. 
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tained by circumstantial evidence that defendant had told 
fellow workmen that he was going with a "blond" and that 
he would have to get rid of her; that on the day of the crime 
the deceased told other persons that sha was going that night 
with "Prank," a nickname which defendant had assumed; that 
an automobile similar to one owned by defendunt was observed 
parked near the scene of the crime; that hair and finger marks 
identieal with those of the deceased were found in defendant's 
car; that particles of blood were found on the coat which de-
fendant was wearing that evening; and that on his apprehen-
sion he denied that he knew the deceased. 
[2] Witnesses - Impeachment - Bias-Procuring or Suppressing 
Evidence.-A witness who has testified to material matters may 
be cross-examined as to Iris attempt to bribe other witnesses, 
and it may be shown by other witnesses that he offered bribes 
to obtain false testimony. The attempt to suborn witnesses, if 
proved, is material in weighing the testimony of the one !;uilty 
of the attempt. 
[3a, 3b] Homicide - Evidence - Declarations of Deceased - To 
Show Intent.-In a prosecution for murder, a declaration of 
the decedent that she was going out with "Frank," which was 
defendant's nickname, on the evening the crime was committed, 
was admissible for the limited purpose of showing thedece-
dent's intent and that such intent was probably carried out, 
where such declaration was made under circumstances which 
could create no suspicion of untruth, and where the declara-
tion and the logical inference to be drawn therefrom, namely, 
that she was with defendant that night, were relevant to the 
issue of defendant's guilt. 
(4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations of Intent.~ 
Declarations of an intent to do a certain act in the future are 
not, strictly speaking, part of the tram,action, but more prop-
erly fall within Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 15, as one of 
"Any other facts from which the facts in issue are presumed 
or are logically inferable." To be admissible, such a declara-
tion must tend to prove the declarant's intention at the time 
it was made; it must have been made under circumstances 
which naturally give verity to the utterance; and it must be 
relevant to an issue in the case. 
[5] Homicide-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.-It 
is proper to refuse to give an instruction as to a lesser degree, 
or as to an included lesser offense, if the evidence warrants 
[2] See 27 Ca1.Jur. 125. 
[4J Sec 8 Cal.Jur. 90; 20 Am.Jur. 491. 
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only a verdict of first degree murder in the event that the 
accused is guilty at all. 
[6] Criminal Law _ Appeal- Harmless and Reversible Error-
Jury_Communications with Judge.-In a prosecution for 
murder, a communication by the jury with the trial judge out 
of the presence of defendant and his counsel regarding the 
question whether the jury might render a decision of life im-
prisonment and not eligible for parole, to which the judge 
answered "No," did not constitute reversible error where, even 
if such communication had been made in open court,· the 
court could not have responded by any answer other than 
"No" or its equivalent, namely, that the jury was to be guided 
solely by the instructions already given. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Santa Clara County and from an order denying a new trial. 
William F~ James, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction affirmed.,' 
Joseph P. Bullock for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and 'JamesF~BrehL' 
nan, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.: i 
SHENK,J.-The defendant, Florencio "Frank" Alcalde, 
was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced' to suffer 
the penalty of death. His motion for anew trial was denied; 
He appealed from the judgment and from an order denying 
his motion for a new trial. ' 
On Monday morning, November 23,1942, the body ofBer-
nice Curtis was found in a plowed field adjacent to Alma 
Road between Palo Alto and Mountain View in Santa Clara 
County. Death had been caused by a basal fracture of the, 
skull resulting from the application of some bluntinstrnment 
or substance. The jaw also showed a fracture. The eyes 
were blackened and the forehead lacerated. The position'of 
the body was facedown, the head and hair were matied,wi:th 
blood, the sod beneath was soaked with blood, the face lap'_ 
peared to have been pressed into the sod, and the head was 
covered with clods of earth. Bloody handprints were. per-
ceptible on the fence boards bordering Alma Road. Awo-
man's shoe, some "bobby" pins, a comb, and some wearing 
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were found on the road near where the body lay. The mate 
to the shoe was found on the highway several hundred feet 
away. The circumstances under which the body was discov-
ered indicated unmistakably that Bernice Curtis had been 
killed, with premeditated design. 
[1] The defendant's main contention is that the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain the jury's conclusion that he was the 
perpetrator of the crime. The evidence was in the main 
circumstantial. 
The deceased was a divorced woman of about thirty years 
of age. She was described as a "blonde," her hair having 
been bleached. About four months prior to her death she 
had gone to San Francisco from Chicago to be with and to 
assist her married sister and the latter's husband, who were 
about to become parents. She stayed with them in their 
home on Sacramento Street until after the event. She then 
moved to a rooming house on San Jose A venue where other 
young women resided and with one of whom she shared a 
room. She accepted employment at a cigar store located at 
Powell and Market Streets in San Francisco. 
The defendant worked as a welder at the shipyards of 
the Western Pipe and Steel Company in South San Fran-
cisco. He was married and had been residing with his wife 
and five-year-old daughter in the nearby town of San Bruno 
on premises owned and also occupied by his father. About 
November 9, 1942, because ofa misunderstanding with his 
wife, he moved to a hotel in South San Francisco under the 
assumed name of Frank Galarda. 
It was in evidence that the defendant told other workers 
at the shipyards that he had a "hot blonde" Who visited him 
at his hotel room; that he frequently called her on the tele-
phone; that he showed her picture to his fellow workmen; 
that he never spoke of her by name, but that he used slang 
and low expressions in his references to her. Other evidence 
disclosed that the defendant called Bernice Curtis on the 
telephone at her rooming house. On the 18th of November, 
preceding Bernice Curtis' death, the defendant said to a 
fellow worker that the "blonde" he was going with was the 
type of girl who wanted to marry, that she didn't know he 
was married, that he was going back to his wife, and he, 
would "have to get rid of her some way by the week-end." 
On the morning of Saturday, November 21st, to another fel-
low worker he showed a picture of a blonde woman and an .. 
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other picture of his wife and daughter. The witness took the 
picture of the wife and baby from the defendant's hand say~ 
ing, "You mean to tell me you give up that baby for'this 
girl? There doesn't seem to, be any class out of that," to 
which the defendant replied: "I'll tellyou,Pop; I have Ii 
date with her tonight. I am going to try to have her" com-
mit an act of sex perversion on me "and get rid of her. " 
On November 22d Bernice Curtis stated to two persons, 
her brother-in-law and her roommate, that she was going to 
dinner that night with "Frank." She spent a portion' of 
the day riding horseback with one of the other young women 
who lived at the rooming house on San J ose Avenue. Her riding 
companion saw Bernice board a homeward bound streetcar 
about 4 :30 in the afternoon. That evening at 6 :00 her room" 
mate saw Bernice dressing, and it waS then that 'the hltter 
expressed her intention of going out with Frank. The room-
mate left the house at 6 :15 while Bernice was still dressing; 
Bernice's riding companion arrived home at 6 :45 at which 
time she observed a green sedan in front of the house with 
a man and woman in it, which was then driven away. The 
witness testified that she believed that the woman in the car 
was Bernice. 
The defendant owned and drove a faded 1936 green Chev-
rolet sedan with a dent in the right front door. A green 
Chevrolet sedan was observed parked near the scene of the' 
crime by a bus driver who saw the black fur coat on the road 
in the early morning of November 23d. ' He slowed down to 
pick up the coat, but "straddled" it before the bus, 'coasting, 
could come to a stop. He testified that a little farther up the 
road, close to the fence, was a parked Chevrolet, "between a 
'34 and '37, faded paint job, old paint,. sort of green colored," 
with its lights burning, its right front door open, but that 
the car was unoccupied. He looked at his wrist watch, the 
hands of which pointed to 12 :45, put the bus in gear and 
drove on, leaving the coat, which was picked up shortly 
thereafter by another motorist. The bus driver also testified 
that he saw the car again about a week or ten days later 
when it was parked at the rear of ' the sheriff's office in San 
Jose. The car that he observed at the latter time was ad-
mittedly the defendant's car. An impression was made of a 
tire mark found at the scene of the crime. It showed the 
Bame kind of tire as that llSed by the defendant on his auto-
", 
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mobile. The police officer who patrolled the alley to the rear 
of the hotel in South San Francisco on the morning of No-
vember 23d testified that there was only one car there at 
12 :20, a Chevrolet Coupe. He patrolled the alley the next 
time at 2 :20, and then saw also parked in the alley a 1936 
green Ohevrolet sedan with a flat front tire. He was able to 
identify it as the defendant's car because on the early morn. 
ing of the previous November 20th he saw the same car 
parked in a restricted outlying district of South San Fran-
eisco, when he flashed a light on the defendant and the de-
ceased, whom he recognized later from a photograph, and 
examined the defendant's operator's license. The period be-
tween 12 :45 and 2 :20 a. m. was ample time within which to 
cover the distance between the scene of the crime and the 
hotel in South San Francisco by automobile. 
There was testimony that hair found on the ceiling of the 
defendant's car was identical with the decedent's hair, SOme 
of which was received in evidence. A fingerprint found on 
the rear-view mirror was shown to be identical with the thumb 
print of the decedent. A bit of dyed feather found at the 
scene of the crime was identical with feathers in the defen-
dant's hat. Particles of human blood were found on a coat 
belonging to the defendant and which he was wearing on the 
evening of November 22d. On the Monday or Tuesday fol-
lowing the night of the crime the defendant took his soiled 
linen to a different laundry from that which he had been 
in the habit of patronizing. The inside of the car was quite 
damp indicating that it had been washed. Spots on the 
upholstery reacted positively to the presumptive blood test. 
There was a fracture on the right front side of the windshield 
Of the defendant's car which a witness testified was not there 
before the 23d of November, but which he observed for the 
first time on the 24th. ' 
Upon his apprehension '~he defendant denied that he knew 
Bernice Curtis, that he ever bought flowers or gaye flowers to 
her, or that he ever took her out. On the trial he took the 
stand in his own defense and there admitted that those state-, 
ments were false. He testified that he met the deceased at a 
pUblic dance in San Francisco about three weeks prior to 
November 22, 1942; that he took her to other dances, drove 
her about in his car, bought her corsages, and that on one 
occasion she visited him at his hotel rOOm in South San Fran-
cisco. He claimed that the last time he saw her was on Sat-
Apr. 1944] PEOPLE v. ALcALD]J 
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urday night, November 21st, when he drove her home from 
a dance. He attempted to establish that ,on November 22d 
he arrived at the hotel from work about 4 :30 in the afternoon 
and parked his car in the alley ; that the cur was not ,again 
removed until 6 :30 or 7 :00 the next mornirig. He testified 
that he played rummy in a pool hall from about ,6 :3q unti~ 
9 :00 on Saturday evening with his father and two friends 
whom he named; that he told his father he was going hack 
to his wife; that he went to the car, discovered the tire was 
flat, and telephoned his home; that there was no answer, so 
he went back to his hotel room about 9 :30 and to bed; that 
about 11 :30 that night he heard a friend coughirig, in the, 
adjoining room, inquired the trouble, and received an answer. 
His testimony in this respect was directly contradict,ed by 
the men he hoped would corroborate him. They testified that 
they did not see him after six 0 'clock on the everiirig .of the' 
22d; that the conversation, about the cough did take phlCe 
but that it occurred about nine 0 'clock on the morning of the 
23d. The only witness who testified in support of the defen~ 
dant's asserted alibi was his father who stated that ,he left 
his son at nine o'clock on the night of Nov~mber 22d, when 
the defendant said to him, "Tell my wife I, come home . to-
morrow." But the father was discredited by evidence that 
he offered to pay two witnesses' 'good, and well" if they 
would testify that the' defendant was in his hotel room at 
9 :30 on the night of November 22d. , 
The defendant also testified that about 6:30 or, 7 :00 on 
the morning of November 23d he changed the val~eon the 
wheel carrying the :flat tire, put air in the tire, and went .to 
his home in San Bruno where he washed the,car"altllough:,it; 
was raining, andthat his wifebrushedollt th,e'interi0r~il'iIfI';l,) 
admitted that he returned to the hotel aboutninEl. Q'cloc:\r.the" 
same morning to get his clothes. He stated thltt, th~f~~et~t~' 
, " '. :,','; I ,,',' 
in the windshield of his car occllrred in the previou~;.lp.6;ntP,; 
oflJune. "To officers before the trial he said that)(Had.¥~p:: 
pened some time ago when he "slammed on" his,btaJi:es ,an~a ' 
girl he had with him struck, her head against the'jvindshield~ 
!Without recounting further details appeari#g 'in' the ,r,ec~ ", 
ord it becomes apparent from the foregoing n:u~rative' that, 
the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the cri~e and to establish 
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In People v. Nagy, 199 Cal. 235, 236 [248 P. 906J, it was 
said: "Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and may be 
as conclusive in its convincing force as the testimony of direct 
witnesses to the overt act. Circumstances very largely con. 
trol the conduct of men in the most important affairs of life 
and may be sufficient to justify a conviction of crime where 
they are such as to exclude any other reasonable theory than 
that of the guilt of the accused." That circumstantial evi. 
dence may be as convincing in its force and as conclusive as 
the testimony of witnesses to the overt act was reiterated in 
People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714, 725 [43 P.2d 260], where it 
was said: "The right to draw proper inferences from the 
evidence is a function of the jury; and as long as its con. 
clusions do not do violence to reason, an appellate court is 
not permitted to substitute its finding of the ultimate fact 
for that reached by the constitutional as well as the statutory 
arbiter thereof." 
The defendant relies on People v. Lamson, 1 Ca1.2d 648 
[36 P.2d 361J, wherein the judgment of conviction was reo 
versed. As stated heretofore that case decided nothing except 
that the judgment be reversed.· (People v. Newland, 15 Cal. 
2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778J.) In the Newland case it was 
said: "If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict 
of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the 
innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with 
the determination of the jury," citing numerous cases. 
In the present case the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 
premeditated murder may not fairly be questioned. The rec. 
ord otherwise is sufficient to support the conclusion of the 
jury that the infel'ences to be drawn therefrom were consist. 
ent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other 
rational hypothesis. 
[2] The defendant claims that prejudicial error resulted 
from the trial court's ruling permitting the cross-examina_ 
tion by the prosecution of the defendant's father on the ques-
tion of his alleged offer to pay two witnesses to testify, con .. 
trary to the fact, that they saw the defendant in the hotel 
at 9 :30 p. m. on November 22d. The ruling was not errone-
ous. A witness who has testified to material matters may be 
cross-examined as to his attempt to bribe other witnesses and 
it may be shown by other witnesses that he offered bribes 
to obtain false testimony. The father testified to a material 
Apr. 1944] PEOPLE V. ALCALDE 
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matter which, if true, would tend to establish the defendant's 
alibi. The attempt to suborn witnesses, if proved,is material 
in weighing the testimony of the one guilty of the aW~~npt. 
(People v. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624 [49 P. 833]; 27 Cal. 
JUl'. p. 125.) . .... .•... <." 
[3a] The defendant contends that prejudicial error was 
committed by admitting in evidence over the defendant's 
objection the declarations of the decedent made on November 
22d that she was going out with "Frank" that evening. In 
overruling the objection the court took the precaution to state 
in the presence of the jury that the evidence was' admitted 
for the limited purpose of showing the decedent's intention. 
It is argued by the defendant that declarations not under 
oath, made when the declarant is not confronted by the ad-
verse party, are admissible to prove physicial orfuental' con-
dition and only when either conditi()n is a matter in issue. 
The. admission of such utterances, due precaution having been 
taken by the court as here, is not so limited. 
This is not a case such as People v. Wright, 167·CII.1.1 [138 
P. 349], or People v. Thomas, 51 Cal.App. 731 [197 P. 677], 
where the defendant was charged with homicide resulting 
from criminal abortion and the physical condition of the de-
cedent was a matter in issue. Nor is it a case such as Estate 
of Snowball, 157 Cal. 301 [107 P. 598], or Bridge v. Ruggles, 
202 Cal. 326 [260 P. 553], where the mental state of the 
declarants was material on issues of duress and undue influ-
ence. In those cases the declarants' utterances were received 
in evidence not to prove their truth, but to indicate the 
mental condition of the declarants. (See, also, Adkins v. 
Brett, 184 Cal. 252 [193 P. 251J ; Estate of Carson, 184 Cal. 
437 [194 P. 5,17 A.L.R. 239].) In the present case the de-
cedent's mental condition at the time of her declaration was 
not an issue, and her utterance could not be offered as proof 
thereof. Her utterance was hearsay. It was made' extraju-
dicially and offered as proof of the truth of its content. It 
was a declaration of intent to do an act in the future, offered 
as evidence that the deceased had the intent she declared and 
that the intent was probably carried out, namely, that she 
intended to and did go out that night with a man named 
"Frank." 
From the declared intent to do a particular thing an in-
ference that the thing was done may fairly be drawn. Such 
186 
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declarations have been deemed admissible where they pos. 
sessed a high degree of trustworthiness. Where they are rele-
vant to an issue in the case and the declarant is dead or 
otherwise unavailable the necessity for their admission has 
been recognized. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 
U.S. 285 [12 S.Ot. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706], appears to be the 
leading case on the admissibility of declarations of intent to 
do an act as proof that the act thereafter was accomplished. 
The courts of this state have followed what is deemed to be 
the weight of authority (see Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed. 1923, 
§ 1725; 19 CaI.L.Rev. 231 and 367; 35 Harv.L.Rev. 302, 444) 
to the effect that declarations of present intent are admissi-
ble to prove a future act. In cases of homicide the admissi-
bility of uncommunicated threats of the deceased against the 
defendant has been upheld to show that the declarant was 
the aggressor. (People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; People v. 
Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676; People v. Alivtre, 55 Cal. 263; People 
v. Thomson 92 Cal. 506 [28 P. 589] ; People v. McGann, 194 
Cal. 688 [230 P. 169]; People v. Spraic, 87 Cul.App. 724 
[262 P. 795].) Declarations by the deceased of an intent to 
commit suicide have been held admissible. (Rogers v. Man-
hattan Life Insurance Co., 138 Cal. 285 [71 P. 348]; Ben-
jamin v. District G"and Lodge, 171 Cal. 260 [152 P. 731] ; 
People v. Tugwell, 28 Cal.App. 348 [152 P. 740]; see, also, 
Wilbur v. Emergency Hospital Assn., 27 Cal.App. 751 [151 
P. 155].) 
In If!tate of McNam~81 Cal. 82 [183 P. 552. 7 A.L.R. 
313], mvolving the issue of paternity, a declaration of inten-
tion of the husband to leave his home and go to a distant 
city was held admissible to show that the declarant actually 
went where he said he was going. The court said, in reliance 
on Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillman, supra, that it was 
well established that declarations of· intention were admissi-
ble uuder such circumstances. In Union Oil Co. v. Stewart. 
158 Cal. 149 [110 P. 313, Ann.Cas. 1912A 5fi7], an action 
to quiet title, a husband's declaration of intent to desert his 
wife was admitted as bearing upon the fact of desertion. 
In People v. Thomas, supra, a declaration of intent to go 
to the defendant's office for an operation was admitted as 
proof that the intention was carried out. Admissibility of a 
declaration of intent to go to a certain place was upheld in 
the case of eeople y-.,.!10ng Si!!:.2, 38 Cal.App. 253 [175 P. 
911J, where the defendant sought to rely on his own lleclara-
Apr. 1944] PEOPLE v. ALCALDE 
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tion to establish an alibi. (See, also, People v~ Burke, 18 
Cal.App. 72 [122 P. 435].) . . 
In other jurisdictions cases are ,found which recognize the 
admissibility of declarations of intent to go to a certain place. 
or with a certain person in the future. (Hunterv. State, 
40 N.J.L. 495; State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474 [65 N.W. 
63] ; State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312 [73 P. 562, 633].) 
[4] In some of the cases the declaration of an intent to 
do a certain act in the future has been admitted as a part 
of the res gestae. But such declarations are not, strictly 
speaking, part of the transaction. They are not encompassed 
within section 1850 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... They 
more properly fall within section 1870, subdivision 15, as one 
of "Any other facts from which the facts in issue are pre, 
sumed or are logically inferable." Greenleaf on Evidence, 
vol. 1, 16th ed., § 162, points out that the existence of a per-
son's design or plan to do a certain thing is relevant circum-
stantially to show that he did it, and may be evidenced by 
his assertion of present intent when made in a natural way 
and not under circumstances of suspicion; that the declara-
tion is admissible not properly as part of the res gestae, but 
merely as an exception to the general rule excluding hear-
say evidence; that where such declarations have been excluded 
it has usually been due to a misapplication of the res gestae 
doctrine. Some courts have expressly rejected any necessity 
for concluding that they were part of the res gestae. (Com-
monwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180 [31 N.E. 961, 24 
L.R.A. 235] ; State v. Mortensen, supra.) 
No attempt need be made here to define or summarize all 
the limitations or restrictions upon the admissibility of dec-
larations of intent to do an act in the future or to indicate 
what degree of unavailability or corroboration should exist 
in every case. Elements essential to admissibility are that. 
the declaration must tend to prove the declarant's intention 
at the time it was made; it must have been made under cir-
cumstances which naturally give verity to the utterance; it 
must be relevant to an issue in the case .. Those qualifications 
are here present. [3b] The declaration of the decedent 
made on November 22d that she was going out with Frank 
that evening stated a present intention to do an act hi the 
future. Certainly it was a natural utterancemad(!'under 
circumstances which could create nosuspicion of, unt~uth in. 
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the statement of her intent. It did not necessarily refer to 
the defendant as the person named. But the defendant was 
called "Frank" as a nickname and he registered as Frank 
at the hotel where he lived. The defendant admittedly had 
been entertaining the decedent. Manifestly that fact, together 
with other corroborating circumstances, bore directly on the 
question, of the relevancy of the declaration. Unquestionably 
the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical infer-
ence to be drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the 
defendant that night, were relevant to the issue of the guilt 
of the defendant. But the declaration was not the only fact 
from which an inference could be drawn that the deceased 
was with the defendant that night. Other facts were in evi-
dence from which the inference could reasonably be drawn. 
The cumnlationof facts corroborative of the guilt of the de-
fendant was sufficient to indicate that the triaJ court did not 
err in admitting the declaration. 
[5] The trial court refused to infltruct the jury at the de-
fendant's request on the subjects of second degree murder 
and manslaughter. The court submitted to the jury the al. 
ternatives of finding the defendant guilty of first degree mur.' 
der or of acquitting him,. The defendant assigns the refusal 
to instruct as requested and the instruction given as preju-
dicial error. 
Instructions are to be given with reference to the facts be-
fore the jury. The facts unquestionably pointed to a pre. 
meditated homicide. No defense was offered by the defendant 
except that of alibi. It is proper to refuse to give an instruc. 
tion as to a lesser degree, or as to an included lesser offense, 
if the evidence warrants only a verdict of first degree mur-
der in the event the accused is guilty at all. (People v. 
Watts, 198 Oal. 776, 793 [247 P. 884J; People v. Lapara, 
181 Cal. 66, 73 [183 P. 545J.) There was therefore no error 
in the refusal to give the requested instructions or in the 
giving of the instruction complained of. Furthermore it ap-
pears from the record that the defendant had a full and fair 
trial and that the jury was otherwise correctly instructed. 
[6] During the deliberations of the jury a sheet of fools-
cap paper was delivered to the trial judge on which was writ-
ten the question, with emphasized words as indicated, "May 
we render a decision of life imprisonment and not eligible 
for parole1" followed by the foreman's signature. The judge 
returned the paper to the foreman with the notation thereon, 
Apr. 1944J PEOPLE 'V.' ALCALDE 
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"The answer is ' No'. " Prejudice is asserted because of this 
communication between the judge and jury out of the pres-
ence of the defendant and his counsel. 
It has been said that courts are practically unanimouS in 
holding that private communications between court and jury 
are improper, and that all communications shonId be made iIi 
open court. (Dodge v. United States, 258 F. 300 [169 C.C.A. 
316J.) Ordinary procedure would require that the trial judge 
afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any such 
communication and to have the opportunity to make, timely 
objection to any action by the court or jury ,which might , be 
deemed irregular. But in this instance the, coUrt' CQUld not 
have responded by any other answer than "No',' .or itS'equiv~:, 
lent, namely, that the jury was to be guided solely by the in:- , 
structions already given. The answer of the ,trial' judge ' coUld 
properly have been made over the objection of the' def~iidant 
or his counsel if the ordinary procedure had 'been 'foilo~e(t'. ' 
The episode may not be deemed to be prejudicial, arid ',woUld 
therefore not justify a reversal of the judgment o:r'o(the 
order denying the motion for a new trial. . ' "', • ' , ':'; 
The judgment and the order are affirmed.' " " .' 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., alid Schauer, J;;tion-
curred. . , 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is my opinion that the trial' 
court erred in admitting the testimony that the deceased said 
on November 22d that she was going out with "Frank" that 
evening. A declaration of intention is admissible to show 
that the declarant did the intended act, if there are corrobo-
rating circumstances and if the declaralitis dead or unavail-
able and hence cannot be put on the witness stand. (See 
McBaine, Admissibility in California of Declarations of Physi-
calor Mental Condition, 19 Cal.L.Rev. 231, 371, 378.) A 
declaration as to what one person intended to do, however, 
cannot safely be accepted as evidence of what another prob-
ably did. (See Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty Three 
Years After, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 709, 717, 719.) The declaration 
of the deceased in this case that she was going out with Frank 
is also a declaration that he was going out with her, and it 
could not be admitted for the limited purpose of showing 
that she went out with him at the time in question without 
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Mr. Justice Cardozo, "Discrimination so subtle is a feat h~. 
yond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating 
clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker 
sounds. It is. for ordinary minds, and not for psychoana-
lysts, that our ru1es of evidence are framed." (Shepard v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 [54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196].) 
Such a declaration could not be admitted without the risk 
that the jury would conclude that it tended to prove the acts 
of the defendant as well as of the declarant, and it is clear 
that the prosecution used the declaration to that end. There 
is no dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as to where 
she was at the time of her death. Since the evidence is over-
whelming as to who the deceased was and where she was 
when she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served 
by admitting her declarations of what she intended to do on 
the evening of November 22d. The only purpose that could 
be served by admitting such declarations would be to induce 
the belief that the defendant went out with the deceased, 
took her to the scene of the crime and there murdered her. 
Her declarations cannot be admitted for that purpose with-
out setting aside the rule against hearsay. 
The evidence in question was so damaging to the defendant 
that it cannot reasonably be said that it probably had no 
effect on the jury's verdict. (People v. Putnam, 20 Ca1.2d 
885, 892, 893 [129 P.2d 367].) 
Edmonds, J., concurred 
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